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To date no analysis of Malta’s Strategic Culture has appeared in the academic 
literature, so that this chapter is a case of exploring unchartered waters. By 
taking a small state perspective, it may serve as a contribution to a neglected 
and understudied segment of the literature on strategic culture which mainly 
focuses on large states and big powers. This neglect of small states is under-
standable, given that they can hardly be considered as significant “movers 
and shakers” of the international system, unless their actions entangle larger 
powers in their conflicts or ambitions. At the same time, small states have 
been growing in importance and in number. In the contemporary global pro-
cesses of regionalism and alliance-building small states matter a lot. 
Indeed, without entering the complicated maze of how to define a small 
state and using a quantitative definition applied by the British Common-
wealth Secretariat, designating as small states those with a population of less 
than 1.5 million, we find that four EU member states (Malta, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, Estonia) out of 27 easily fit into this category. In the case of Malta, 
its strategic culture is heavily influenced by its neutral status which was en-
trenched in the Constitution in 1987 and plays a central role in Maltese for-
eign and security policy. The relevant constitutional provision reads (in 
abridged form): “Malta is a neutral state actively pursuing peace, security and 
social progress among all nations by adhering to a policy of non-alignment 
and refusing to participate in any military alliance. Such a status will, in par-
ticular, imply that:(a) no foreign military base will be permitted on Maltese 
territory; (b) no military facilities in Malta will be allowed to be used by any 
foreign forces except at the request of the Government of Malta, and only in 
the following cases: (i) in the exercise of the inherent right of self-defence 
[…]; or (ii) whenever there exists a threat to the sovereignty, independence, 
neutrality, unity or territorial integrity of […] Malta; […]; (e) the shipyards 
of the Republic of Malta will be used for civil commercial purposes, but may 
also be used, within reasonable limits of time and quantity, for the repair of 
military vessels which have been put in a state of non-combat or for the con-
struction of vessels; and in accordance with the principles of non-alignment 
the said shipyards will be denied to the military vessels of the two superpow-
ers.”(Constitution of Malta:Chapter 1, Article 1 [3]) 
Nowadays, there is cross-party agreement that the definition of neutrality 
in the Maltese Constitution needs to be revised in order to better reflect pre-
sent day realities. Yet, until now, the political parties have been unable to 
propose, let alone enact any changes and the debate on the need to amend the 
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Constitution surfaces from time to time and then fizzles out just as suddenly 
as it starts. 
Generally, Malta’s strategic culture cannot be fully understood without 
reference to the domestic political context and the main political parties 
which have helped to shape it. The world view of these political parties is 
moulded by a mixture of historic facts and myths linked to the island’s histo-
ry, insularity and geographic position at the centre of the Mediterranean be-
tween the southern shores of continental Europe and the North African coast. 
The dominant Historic myths which colour the Maltese self-perception in-
clude the arrival of Christianity in 60 AD brought by the Apostle Paul; the 
“deliverance” of the islands from the Arabs by a band of Norman adventurers 
in 1090 (depicted as a return to Christianity after 200 years of Arab Muslim 
rule); the repulsion of the Ottoman attempt to seize the islands in the Great 
Siege of 1565, and the successful resistance to the Italo-German aerial bom-
bardments of World War II (WWII), for which the islands were awarded the 
George Cross which is inscribed on the national flag.1 In popular mythology, 
WWII is depicted as the “second great siege”. Both sieges are commemorat-
ed on the 8 September. The historical narrative provides a sense of “a capaci-
ty to overcome against great odds”, but successive foreign occupations to 
which Malta has been subjected, instils a sense of vulnerability. This perhaps 
explains why, in fact, in the security domain, the Maltese want to be masters 
of their own defence but at the same time believe that they can only achieve 
security with the help of others. 
Level of Ambition 
Consisting of three inhabited islands with a total population of 420,000, a 
land area of 316 km2, and surrounded by much more powerful neighbours, 
Malta’s self-perception is one of vulnerability – but without a sense of resig-
nation. Malta has instead actively pursued policies to address this vulnerabil-
ity and strengthen its resilience in three inter-dependent ways: self-help, 
reliance on outside powers and the energetic pursuit of multilateralism. Since 
independence from Britain in 1964, Malta has neither been indifferent to 
international security issues, nor has it pretended to be a world leader. On 
occasions it has also shown a readiness to forestall future security threats. It 
has focused its attention on its immediate surroundings, the Mediterranean 
region. Last but not least, it has adopted a broad meaning of security which, 
besides the more traditional concerns of defending its territorial integrity and 

1  The George Cross is the highest UK Civil decoration. It is included in the Maltese flag by 
virtue of Article 3 of the Maltese Constitution. 
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sovereignty, also looks at the newer challenges such as terrorism, climate 
change and irregular migration. When Malta acquired statehood in 1964, it 
also had to assume responsibility for its own territory, including its territorial 
sea which at around 3,000 km2 is roughly 10 times the islands’ land area, and 
the Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) which was declared in 1971 in accordance 
with the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea and which was the 
first of its kind in the Mediterranean region (Laws of Malta 1971). This is an 
area around Malta measured at 25 nautical miles from the coastal base lines. 
In addition, Malta is responsible for a Search and Rescue Area (SAR) of the 
size of the United Kingdom, which stretches from the coasts of Tunisia to 
Crete. It is a relic of its colonial past and nowadays a cause of friction with 
Italy over responsibility for irregular immigrants located or rescued within it. 
Italy has been pressurizing Malta to relinquish large parts of it, though, for 
reasons of national pride, Malta has resisted this. 
The Strategic Objectives published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
reveal little information on the concrete Maltese security objectives, apart 
from a few familiar statements that have survived intact with varying intensi-
ty throughout the post-independence period, namely that European and Medi-
terranean security are firmly connected, that the United Nations Organisation 
and its institutions and agencies must be the foundation of world peace and 
stability and that effective multilateralism, sanctioned by the United Nations 
Security Council, is necessary to ensure legitimisation of international action 
and the coordination of efforts towards peace, prosperity and stability in the 
world today (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012). However, the Strategic Ob-
jectives place particular emphasis on the Malta’s EU membership on the 
grounds that this increases the island’s international relevance. In fact, the 
underlying assumption seems to be that Malta’s foreign policy ought to seek 
ways and means of operating through the EU structures, aims and objectives. 
It is further stated that: “[A]s a small country and a historic meeting place for 
reconciliation and dialogue, Malta seeks to project the European Union’s 
friendly face towards its neighbours to the South of the Mediterranean. In-
versely, as a country with a closeness and understanding of its southern 
neighbours and the Arab World, Malta seeks to be a trusted interlocutor, and 
a voice sensitive to their realities within the European Union. In the context 
of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Malta’s char-
acteristics are particularly valuable to enhance understanding and stability in 
a region that remains potentially turbulent.” (ibid.) 
The strategic aims of the Armed Force of Malta (AFM) are even less re-
vealing. Apart from defending Malta’s territorial integrity, including the 
airspace even though it has no fighter aircraft, the AFM’s main priorities are 
stated in very general terms as combating terrorism, fighting illicit drug traf-
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ficking, conducting anti-illegal immigrant and anti-illegal fishing operations, 
operating Search and Rescue (SAR) services, and physical/electronic securi-
ty/surveillance of sensitive locations.”2 At the same time the AFM also pro-
vides backup support to the Malta Police Force and other Government De-
partments/Agencies and is prepared to intervene in national emergencies such 
as natural disasters, internal security and bomb disposal. Notwithstanding 
these tasks as well as the new territorial responsibilities assumed on inde-
pendence, and doubtlessly due to continued presence of UK military bases, 
Malta took some time to set up its own army. Today, the AFM consists of 
five major units: three land regiments, an air wing and a maritime squadron 
employing around 2,174 persons in 2010. 
Given its small size and lack of military means, Malta’s tendency is to 
avoid unilateral action and to participate in multilateral initiatives. In recent 
history there was one instance of unilateral action by Malta which happened 
in 2010 when it pulled out of FRONTEX operations repulsing irregular im-
migration in the central Mediterranean. Malta disagreed with the rules of 
engagement which implied that it would have to give shelter to irregular 
immigrants rescued in its SAR operations. Malta always insisted that these 
should be taken to the nearest port of call. Malta has the highest population 
density in the EU estimated at around 1,272 persons per km2 and has been 
insisting on responsibility sharing for the accommodation of the Medi-
terranean boat people arriving on its shores. 
Malta does not say how many military personnel and assets it is ready to 
deploy in peacekeeping missions overseas, but since joining the EU it has 
done so on several occasions and figures provided by the European Defence 
Agency (EDA) show an increasing trend in commitments though in raw 
terms this remains negligible compared to the overall EU commitments. 
According to EDA data, in 2010, Malta’s total deployable forces amounted to 
159, troops actually deployed 18 and sustainable land forces 30 (see table 
below). 
  

2 A note on the Armed Forces of Malta on the Prime Minister’s: http://www.secure2.gov. 
mt/OPM/forzi-armati-malta; last accessed 01.05.2012. 
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Table 4: Malta: Deployed, Deployable and Sustainable Forces 2005–2010 
 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Number of Military 
Personnel 1,588 2,226 2,121 2,120 2,120 2,174 
Troops Deployed1 0 0 0 3 3 18 
Percentage of Troops 
Deployed2 - - - 0.14 0.14 0.83 
Deployable Forces3 159 149 159 159 159 159 
Sustainable Forces4 30 30 30 30 30 30 
Source: European Defence Agency, Defence Data Portal at http://www.eda.europa. 
eu/DefenceData/ 
1 Average number of troops deployed throughout the year. 2 Average number of 
troops deployed as a percentage of total military personnel. 3 (Land) Forces troops 
prepared for deployed operations (NATO’s 50 percent target). 4 (Land) Forces troops 
undertaking or planned for sustained operations (NATO’s 10 percent target). 
It is evident that the priorities of the AFM are vastly more focused on territo-
rial defence and security than in participating in external missions. The num-
bers show this clearly. This is understandable given the small size of the 
army, its limited assets and the vast responsibilities it has, particularly guard-
ing Maltese territorial waters or areas of responsibility against illegal activi-
ties such as terrorism, illicit trafficking in arms, drugs and migrants and ille-
gal fishing. Increased migration in the central Mediterranean has certainly 
stretched the Maltese armed forces to their limits. 
Foreign Policy Orientation 
Given its negligible military power, Malta has traditionally sought external 
military guarantees to fill the shortfall: between 1964 and 1979, it achieved 
this by two fundamentally different defence pacts with Britain signed respec-
tively in 1964 and 1972. In 1971, it adopted non-alignment and then neutrali-
ty from 1979 after the closure of the UK military facilities. However, follow-
ing a dispute with Libya on oil prospecting in disputed territorial waters, 
Malta sought and obtained treaty-based security guarantees from Italy (1980), 
the USSR (1981) and subsequently also from Libya (1984). The Treaty of 
Neutrality with Italy is still in vigore, while as a result of the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the 1981 neutrality treaty reverted to the Russian Federation by 
mutual accord. In 1987 Malta ended the military components and secret codi-
cils in the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed with Libya in 1984 
when relations between the two countries were normalized. This Treaty was 
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eventually amended in 1990 bringing to an end the provisions requiring a 
continuous exchange of information between the two sides on military mat-
ters, and which bound Libya to supply arms and training to the Maltese 
armed forces. (Laws of Malta 1990) Usually, the training of AFM officers 
takes place in Italy, Britain and the United States while personnel involved in 
overseas EU missions normally train in the countries with whose personnel 
they are to be deployed (e.g. in the Netherlands in the case of Somalia – Ata-
lanta). 
In 1973, an Italian military mission financed by the Italian government, 
was established in Malta to assist in infrastructural projects and help the 
AFM in various military tasks, including military training. The mission’s role 
in civilian infrastructural projects was later discontinued. From 2011 the 
mission became known as La Missione Italiana di Collaborazione nel Campo 
della Difesa (MICCD) and its Headquarters is based in Luqa close to the 
AFM’s Headquarters. The Mission participates jointly with the AFM in 
search and rescue operations, advices the Maltese armed forces on all mili-
tary matters and provides training both in Malta and in Italy. Under various 
Italo-Maltese protocols Italy also supplied Malta with military equipment and 
financial aid to acquire assets such as helicopters.(Italian Embassy 2012) 
Malta has no intention of joining NATO and this was made clear when it 
joined the Alliance’s Partnership for Peace (PfP). This is prompted by several 
factors: the constitutional impediment in the form of the neutrality clause and 
lack of support among the public and political elites alike. Historically, after 
the door was slammed in Malta’s face in the early sixties when it put out its 
feelers about the possibility of joining the Alliance, the membership issue 
disappeared from the political radar screen. Subsequently, when Malta as-
sumed the status of neutrality it took a pacifist approach shunning any initia-
tive of a military nature – in addition to forbidding the stationing of foreign 
military forces on Maltese soil. Malta’s PfP membership is itself a saga worth 
analysing because it shows most clearly the divisions and apprehensions that 
exist among political elites. Malta joined PfP in 1995, withdrew in 1996 (at 
the same time as it froze the EU membership application when the Labour 
Party was briefly in government) and rejoined in 2008. PfP membership has 
been politically controversial, and resurfaces from time to time in the domes-
tic political debate notwithstanding that the political parties’ positions have 
converged. Participation of the AFM in any collective defence and peace-
enforcement operation is emphatically excluded. Membership of the PfP 
became important for a pragmatic reason in 2004 when Malta joined the EU 
– to enable it to participate fully in the Berlin Plus arrangement where Malta 
had everything to gain from NATO-originating security information, particu-
larly where relevant to the situation in the Mediterranean region. While the 
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Nationalist Party was keen on joining, the Labour Party opposed this move 
tooth and nail. Turkey, which wanted to block Cyprus from participating in 
the programme, opposed Malta’s participation as well. Only in 2008, was 
Malta able to rejoin the Partnership. Although party consensus has now been 
achieved on PfP membership, the issue remains a very sensitive and divisive 
one in Maltese politics. 
The AFM’s C-Company, a rapid reaction force which is responsible for 
high risk operations at home, is charged with participating in EU-led overseas 
missions. AFM officers are stationed in Brussels to participate in the EU 
military committees. Since September 2008, the AFM has been deploying 
two monitors to Georgia in support of EUMM Georgia. The Maltese moni-
tors were based in Gori to monitor, together with 250 other observers from 26 
of the 27 EU member states, the boundary line which separates Georgia from 
the breakaway region of South Ossetia. From November 2008, the AFM sent 
an officer to the EU’s anti-piracy mission’s operational headquarters in the 
United Kingdom. Malta also participated in Operation Atalanta by deploying 
a 12-man detachment to the Gulf of Aden, on board of Dutch naval vessels. 
Since NATO membership remains out of the question, the dichotomy be-
tween NATO/CSDP does not arise for Malta – more than that, the EU’s 
CFSP-CSDP seem the only route available for Malta in dealing with its secu-
rity, because it opens avenues to join a “security community” that could 
eventually underwrite Maltese national security and help it free itself from 
riskier bilateral arrangements, which, much more likely, might expose Malta 
to the danger of falling under the hegemony of a single country again. Hence, 
Malta is likely to remain a supporter of CFSP and CSDP, including the par-
ticipation in its structures, but unlikely to be a very keen supporter of military 
action outside the EU-framework and borders, unless this is specifically sanc-
tioned by the UN Security Council or is an act of self-defence, as specified in 
the Maltese Constitution. Malta’s participation in the Libyan crisis epitomiz-
es this: It did not join the military campaign nor did it allow Malta’s airfield 
to be used for military operations by NATO forces. It impounded two Libyan 
fighter jets which defected to Malta at the height of the crisis and held them 
until the crisis was over. At the same time Malta showed its readiness to 
participate in a proposed EU humanitarian mission to be sent to Libya after 
the end of the fighting, EUFOR-LIBYA, and to act as a humanitarian base 
for the evacuation of foreign nationals from Libya while the fighting was 
taking place. Malta also served as a base for sending humanitarian aid to 
Libya, particularly to help refugees gathered on the Libyan-Tunisian border. 
Membership of the EU also gives Malta the possibility of participating in 
other EU policies besides the foreign, security and defence policy, such as the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership/Union for the Mediterranean and the Neigh-
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bourhood Policy, which are intended to promote stability and security on the 
EU borders, particularly in the sensitive Mediterranean region. The enhanced 
international status that Malta has acquired as a result of EU membership 
strengthens its role as an interlocutor, capable of transmitting the region’s 
concerns to the European Council and other EU institutions. Membership 
also strengthens Malta’s role in informal security dialogues such as the “5 + 
5” in the western Mediterranean.3 Further, Malta’s EU membership partially 
redresses the internal balance of the Union towards the Mediterranean. 
Scope of Action for the Executive 
The defence portfolio is in the hands of the Prime Minister, responsible to the 
Cabinet. A unit dealing with defence matters has been established at the Of-
fice of the Prime Minister in Valletta, which acts as a liaison between the 
Prime Minister and the head of the armed forces. 
Participation in CFSP/CSDP missions and the PfP encountered political 
resistance within Parliament, leading to some controversial decisions. For 
example, Malta joined EDA before the House of Representatives was infor-
med of this step. Indeed, when the House was eventually informed on 19 July 
2004, the Labour Party which is in opposition, insisted that EDA membership 
was not only uncalled for but went “contrary to the spirit of the Constitu- 
tion and the Labour Party’s policy on neutrality” (House of Representatives 
2004: 1). The government pledged that it would remain vigilant for any de-
velopment within the agency which could in some way compromise Malta’s 
neutrality (ibid.: 4). When Malta reactivated its membership of PfP in 2008, 
the government used the same tactic when dealing with Parliament. 
These two episodes show that parliamentary control is very weak not-
withstanding that defence is occasionally debated in the House. Whichever 
government is in place assumes that it has the mandate to execute its political 
programme and to justify this by referring to the vague commitments made in 
its electoral manifesto. The discussion above has shown that, on “sensitive” 
issues involving defence and security, it is evident that parliamentary in-
volvement often occurs only after the respective event, initially but not al-
ways within the Parliamentary Committee on EU and Foreign Affairs, which 
is rather weak due to the deluge of EU legislation it has to deal with. This 
practice in security and defence matters is contrary to the one used in the case 
of EU legislative proposals, the so called pipeline acquis, when the Com-

3  The participating states are Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco and Mauritania as well as 
Spain, France, Italy, Portugal and Malta. 
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mittee usually discusses the legislation while these proposals are still under 
deliberation in EU Institutions. 
Willingness to Use Military Force 
Maltese military expenditure is traditionally subdued, amounting to just 
0.7 percent of GDP and 1.62 percent of Government spending in 2010. 
Therefore, throughout the years, Malta has relied on external military aid to 
fill the gap. For example, the Armed Forces of Malta operate two Hawker 
Beech King Air B200 maritime patrol aircraft costing around € 19.4 million, 
co-financed by the European Union’s External Borders Fund. In 2009, Malta 
received four new in-shore patrol boats to replace older ones, operated by the 
AFM at a cost of € 9.3 million which were also partially financed by the EU. 
In 2011, the Pentagon gave $ 4.7 million in aid in the form of boats, night-
vision equipment, computers and maritime training for the AFM’s personnel. 
The AFM’s maritime squadron already operated two Protector Class patrol 
boats supplied by the United States under a previous military assistance pro-
gramme. Following EU membership, the Maltese armed forces further bene-
fited from EU direct financial aid to partly offset the financial burden of 
participation in FRONTEX operations in the central Mediterranean.4 
Malta is a very reluctant supporter of the use of force in resolving politi-
cal issues for many reasons: because of its neutralist, pacifist approach en-
shrined in the Constitution; and because as a small state with limited military 
resources it is aware that if military strength becomes the norm when dealing 
with global political issues, small states are most likely to be the losers. Add 
to this her historical experience displaying that war brings nothing but hard-
ships and foreign occupation. 
The Constitution does not refer to the participation of Maltese military 
personnel in international operations. It simply says that should the govern-
ment allow the use of Malta’s military facilities for any operations outside 
Malta, such actions must be decided by the UN Security Council. Throughout 
the period of its independence, Malta never participated in any military oper-
ations beyond its shores, not even in peacekeeping missions approved by the 
UN and it was only after EU membership that it began to participate in EU-
led missions. 
With regard to extremism and terrorism, Malta supports international ef-
forts to eradicate it. However, Malta holds that defeating terrorism cannot be 
achieved by military means alone (although the use of force is not speci-

4  It is estimated that since 2007 Malta received around € 50 million from FRONTEX to 
strengthen the AFM’s capabilities. 
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fically excluded) given “that the root of the problem also lies in extremism 
and extremist organizations that have gained popular support by substituting 
the State where the State has been unable to provide an adequate social secu-
rity safety net to its people”. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2012) 
Conclusion
EU membership put an end to the uncertain politics and alliances of the pre-
vious two decades. The fall of communism soon rendered Malta’s constitu-
tionally entrenched definition of neutrality inoperable in many ways. In the 
rough road to EU membership, not only was Maltese society divided on 
membership, but also on the interpretation of neutrality. The Labour Party 
depicted EU membership as a threat to neutrality, although a number of neu-
tral countries had already joined the Union. When the membership issue was 
finally decided in a referendum and a general election held in 2003, and not-
withstanding that the Labour Party by 2004 had to accept membership, the 
Labour and the Nationalist Party continued to disagree on the security and 
defence issues namely how far should the country participate in the EU’s 
CFSP/CSDP structures and whether Malta should join NATO’s PfP. 
However, there has been a convergence of views of sorts between the 
two major parties. The Nationalists have accepted neutrality as part of the 
1987 constitutional package, while stressing that that its sui generis definition 
does not prevent Malta from participating in the EU’s military structure or 
constrain it to remain neutral in the struggle between democracy and totalitar-
ianism. In contrast, neutrality has political and symbolic value for the oppos-
ing Labour Party: On 31 March of each year, the closure of UK military 
bases is celebrated as “Freedom Day”, both as a party event and as a national 
public holiday, while the Nationalist Party, claims to be “the party of inde-
pendence”. Meanwhile, the Labour Party has also shifted its policy on the 
PfP and on the EDA. Altogether, Malta’s strategic culture has shown a pro-
pensity to evolve but its central characteristic, mostly influenced by neutrali-
ty, remains in place. 
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